30.06.2026

Syria’s Window of Opportunity: Risks to Potential Development

The conflict between the United States and Israel on the one hand, and Iran on the other, has paradoxically increased Syria’s relevance as a potential hub for new transport routes. Whether Damascus can seize this opportunity will depend on domestic stabilisation and the effective reconstruction of state capacity.

The government in Damascus has avoided being drawn into the regional confrontation despite incomplete consolidation of power across the country, the risk of fragmentation, and significant dependence on external actors. Rising uncertainty around traditional transport routes running through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf has led Syria to be increasingly viewed as a component of alternative trade corridors. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are planning to rebuild the Hejaz Railway through Syria and Jordan. Iraq has declared its readiness to reactivate the pipeline from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Baniyas. The emerging Four Seas Initiative envisages Syria as part of a new transport corridor linking the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean.

Syria should make use of the current window of opportunity, in which the interests of most major external actors — with the exception of Israel — are broadly aligned with regard to the country. For the potential benefits to materialise, however, the state must first address several fundamental challenges.

Security deficit
The most important obstacle to seizing this opportunity remains the incomplete consolidation of the state. The central government in Damascus does not exercise full control over its own territory.
The buffer zone along the Golan Heights is occupied by Israel, which supports the independence of the Druze autonomy in As-Suwayda that emerged following ethnic clashes with Sunni Arabs. Similar conflicts also break out occasionally with Kurds and Alawites. The forces of the Islamic State are also growing.
The new Syrian Armed Forces are expected to play a key role in maintaining order and reintegrating the country’s territory. After Ahmad al-Sharaa came to power, the Syrian Arab Armed Forces, which formed the backbone of Bashar al-Assad’s former regime forces, were dissolved. The new army is heterogeneous in nature and consists of formations linked to HTS,[1] other opposition groups, elements of Kurdish structures, including the Syrian Democratic Forces, and foreign jihadist fighters[2] who came to Syria during the civil war.
The Syrian government must build a centralised and hierarchical chain of command, as well as clear structures of accountability. The reorganisation of opposition forces, the integration of the SDF, and the incorporation of foreign fighters must take place through transparent procedures. The government has achieved some limited successes in this area, but the arbitrary and selective nature of the integration process means that some groups remain outside the state system, which may lead to future confrontation with the central government.

Infrastructure under reconstruction
Syria’s basic infrastructure remains deeply degraded and requires large-scale reconstruction. In a 2025 report, the World Bank estimated infrastructure losses at USD 52 billion. Since the beginning of the war, around 70% of power plants and transmission lines have been damaged. Roads, bridges, drinking-water treatment plants, and irrigation canals also require repair.
Access to public services also remains severely constrained. The same report estimates damage to commercial and public buildings at USD 23 billion. In February 2025, more than 40% of hospitals and 60% of first-aid points in Syria remained out of service.
The scale of destruction affecting infrastructure and public services translates into low levels of confidence in the prospects for economic recovery. Public assessments of service provision remain negative: 43% of society assesses internet access positively, 41% access to electricity, 36% healthcare, 35% affordable housing, and 32% drinking-water supply. Only 17% of Syrians assess the state of the economy positively.
The current reconstruction policy adopted by the authorities in Damascus focuses on large infrastructure projects of strategic importance for the energy and natural resources sectors, such as agreements concerning offshore gas exploration and potential extraction. These projects have the potential to increase long-term state revenues and improve the energy balance, but they do not translate directly into better living conditions for the population or the reconstruction of basic infrastructure.
This imbalance in investment priorities limits the pace of rebuilding those segments that are essential for the everyday functioning of the state and society. In conditions of limited trust, both local entrepreneurs and the Syrian diaspora — which possesses significant financial resources and human capital — remain reluctant to engage in reconstruction and the development of local enterprises. The lack of their active participation reduces the willingness of foreign investors to take risks, while the low level of domestic participation is interpreted as a signal of uncertainty about the success of the reconstruction process.

A policy of non-engagement in external conflicts
Since the change of power, Syria has managed to restore relations with the United States, Germany, France, and the GCC states, without directly engaging in any local conflict. In June 2026, President al-Sharaa even ruled out the possibility of intervention in Lebanon, which had been supported by Donald Trump. This posture of strategic neutrality is partly rooted in an awareness of the country’s own weakness, but it allows Syria to project an image of a relatively safe country in an unstable region.
The greatest threat to maintaining this posture is the Turkish-Israeli rivalry, which has intensified since 2023. Israel sees Syria as a potential threat and as part of Turkey’s sphere of influence. Excessively close alignment with Turkey, or attempts to limit Druze autonomy in As-Suwayda, could provoke Israeli military intervention. At the same time, Syria cannot afford to be abandoned by Turkey, which — in the context of the United States’ withdrawal from the region — remains its main security guarantor.

Potential paths of stagnation
The materialisation of potential benefits arising from the current international situation depends on the ability of the authorities in Damascus to simultaneously ensure security, rebuild infrastructure, and maintain strategic neutrality. If these issues are neglected, Syria may find itself on one of several stagnation trajectories:
The Lebanese trap — the absence of a state monopoly on violence and the escalation of tensions with Israel lead to lasting destabilisation, preventing the effective use of diaspora remittances and development assistance.
The Iraqi trap — the maintenance of relative stability and avoidance of direct regional conflicts do not translate into economic development because of infrastructure degradation and the dispersed, unpredictable control of armed forces, which discourages investors.
The Iranian trap — the consolidation of a strong state apparatus ensures internal stability, but at the cost of international isolation and reduced inflows of capital and technology.

Conclusions
Syria is becoming a space through which other actors’ geopolitical and economic projects pass, but it remains uncertain whether the country will be able to translate them into its own development. Transport corridors, pipelines, and new trade connections may increase Syria’s importance, but they do not in themselves create lasting added value.
The case of Syria shows that geographical location does not automatically confer strategic advantage. It can create a window of opportunity, but it cannot substitute for an effective state, secure infrastructure, predictable institutions, and the capacity to absorb capital.
While recognising the very different circumstances, Syria’s case illustrates a mechanism that is also relevant for Poland: geography gains value in wartime, but it does not by itself create lasting advantage. Russia’s war against Ukraine has increased Poland’s importance as NATO’s logistical rear base and as a key element of the Alliance’s eastern flank. Location alone, however, does not guarantee durable benefits. Poland’s current significance may prove temporary if it is not used to further expand infrastructure, strengthen state capacity, and improve the investment attractiveness of the economy.
[1] Hayat Tahrir al-Sham — a Sunni coalition of armed groups that defeated Assad in 2024 and was led by al-Sharaa.
[2] Their number in Syria is estimated at between 3,500 and 10,000, with the most likely estimates pointing to around 5,000. See: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-insurgency-to-statecraft-al-sharaa-and-syrias-foreign-fighters-test/

Jakub Kukulski